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Trade barriers have been declining around the world over the last five decades. 
Countries reduced their tariffs unilaterally as well as concertedly in the framework 
of regional integration agreements. As a consequence, trade flows among 
economies have substantially intensified. According to economic theory, this 
should have had a significant impact on the countries’ specialization patterns. 
However, to our knowledge, there is no direct robust econometric evidence on the 
effect of trade policy on the overall degree of countries’ specialization. This paper 
aims at filling this gap in the literature. We focus on ten Latin American countries 
members of the LAIA (Latin American Integration Association) over the period 
1985-1998. These countries are natural case studies because in the last two decades 
they implemented broad and comprehensive trade liberalization programs, both 
generally and preferentially, starting from relatively high tariff protection levels. 
Our econometric results suggest that reducing own MFN tariffs is associated with 
increasing manufacturing production specialization. Furthermore, we find that 
preferential trade liberalization and differences in the degree of unilateral openness 
have resulted in increased dissimilarities in manufacturing production structures 
across countries. These results are robust to the specialization measure being used, 
the correction for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, serial 
correlation and endogeneity biases, and the inclusion of indicators to account for 
the real exchange misalignment prevailing in the region during the period under 
examination. 
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Trade barriers have been declining around the world over the last five decades. Countries 
reduced their tariffs unilaterally as well as concertedly in the framework of regional 
integration agreements. As a result, trade flows among economies have substantially grown. 
They have increased by a factor of 89 between 1953 and 2003. According to the economic 
theory, either due to comparative advantage or agglomeration economies, this should have 
had a significant impact on the countries’ specialization patterns. Has the existing empirical 
evidence confirmed this theoretical prediction? 
  Several studies present descriptive evidence on the evolution of specialization 
indicators over periods of declining trade barriers.1 This evidence mostly concerns 
developed countries. However, to our knowledge, there is no direct robust econometric 
evidence on the effect of trade policy on the overall degree of developing countries’ 
specialization.. This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature. Specialization is worth 
being studied because it affects the level of welfare, the speed of economic growth, and the 
degree of macroeconomic convergence across economies.2 
We focus on ten Latin American countries members of the LAIA (Latin American 
Integration Association) over the period 1985-1998. These countries are natural case studies 
because in the last two decades they implemented broad and comprehensive trade 
liberalization programs starting from relatively high tariff protection levels. More 
specifically, these countries pursued unilateral plans and also engaged in regional 
integration initiatives. Thus, this set of nations provides a constellation of trade reforms, 
which is rich enough to assess their repercussions. Second, some of these economies exhibit 
substantial changes in their specialization degrees over the aforementioned period. On 
average, production specialization seems to be increasing and manufacturing structures 
seems to be becoming increasingly different. We can therefore analyze to what extent 
general and preferential trade liberalization have contributed to shape the evolving 
specialization patterns in the region.  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000), Brülhart (2001), and Combes and Overman (2003). 
2 See, e.g., Lucas (1988), Quah and Rauch (1990), Eichengreen (1993), Krugman (1993), Frankel and Rose (1998), and 
Redding (1999).   2
We estimate measures of overall specialization from sectoral value added to describe 
the countries’ specialization level, both absolute and relative, and we also compute average 
MFN (Most Favored Nation) and preferential tariffs, which allow us to explicitly 
characterize the countries’ trade policies. Our econometric results suggest that reducing own 
MFN tariffs is associated with increasing production specialization. Furthermore, we find 
that preferential trade liberalization and differences in the degree of unilateral openness 
have resulted in increased dissimilarities in manufacturing production structures across 
countries. These results are robust to the specialization measure being used, the correction 
for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, serial correlation and 
endogeneity biases, and the inclusion of indicators to account for the real exchange 
misalignment prevailing in the region during the period under examination. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. 
Section 3 derives the estimation equation and addresses relevant econometric issues. Section 
4 outlines some basic stylized facts about the trade policy reforms introduced in Latin 
American countries since the mid-1980s. Section 5 reports some descriptive evidence on the 
patterns of manufacturing production specialization and their evolution over the sample 
period and reports our main findings. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Data   
 
Our sample includes ten members of the LAIA: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.3 
We use annual sectoral value added at the 3-digit level of the ISIC, Revision 2, to 
characterize overall manufacturing production specialization in these countries over the 
period 1985-1998. These data come from the database PADI prepared by the United Nation’s 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and International 
Industrial Statistics made available by the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO). Table A1 in the Appendix identifies the specific data sources and 
time coverage, whereas Table A2 lists the sectors. 
  Average MFN tariffs have been calculated for each country in the sample over the 
period 1985-2001. In addition, bilateral preferential tariffs have been computed for each 
economy over the same lapse. We have therefore data on the average tariff barriers set and 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, we do not have sectoral value added for Paraguay.   3
faced by countries, both on a MFN basis and under bilateral and multilateral regional trade 
arrangements. In particular, we can distinguish between general trade liberalization and 
average bilateral preferential trade liberalization in the context of specific blocs such as the 
Andean Community and MERCOSUR. Table A3 reports country and period coverage of 
tariff data. 
  We use GDP per capita as a proxy for both relative endowments and level of 
development. Data on this variable are expressed at market prices in constant 1995 U.S. 
d o l l a r s  a n d  c o m e  f r o m  t h e  o n  l i n e  s o c i o e c o n o m i c  d a t a b a s e  B A D E I N S O  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  
UN’s ECLAC. We also incorporate the real effective exchange rate for imports, which is an 
index (1995=100) calculated by the UN’s ECLAC and available from its on line 
macroeconomic database. Finally, we include a measure of real exchange rate misalignment 
taken from Terra and Valladares (2003). They estimate misalignments as departures from the 
long run equilibrium exchange rate as obtained following the methodology proposed by 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), i.e., estimating a long run relationship between the real 
exchange rate and economic fundamentals using cointegration techniques. Table A4 in the 
Appendix presents additional detailed information on these variables. 
 
3  Empirical Specification and Econometric Strategy 
  
3.1 Empirical Specification 
 
To define the estimation equation and thus the appropriate functional forms as well as the 
relevant variables to be included, we will follow Harrigan (1997) and Redding (2002). The 
idea is to derive theory-consistent summary measures of specialization from the standard 
international trade theory.  
  Assume a set of small countries, each of them endowed with a fixed amount of 
factor of productions. These factors are used to produce final goods under constant returns 
to scale and perfect competition conditions such that the value of output is maximized. This 
value is given by: 
( ) ct ct ct v p r X , =   (1) 
where r() is the revenue function, p is the vector of final goods prices, v is the vector 
of production factors, c={1,…,C} indexes countries and t time. As long as the revenue   4
function is twice continuously differentiable, the vector of the economy’s profit-maximizing 
net output is given by:4 
() ( ) ct ct ct ct ct c p v p r v p x ∂ ∂ = , ,   (2) 
We will further assume Hicks-neutral technology differences across countries, 
industries, and time, so that the production function takes the following form: 
( ) cjt j cjt cjt v f x θ =   (3) 
where 
cjt θ parametrizes technology in industry j of country c at time t. As shown in 
Dixit and Norman (1980), in this case, the revenue function is given by:  
( ) ( ) ct ct ct ct ct v p r v p r , , θ =   (4) 
 where 
ct θ is an nxn diagonal matrix of the technology parameters 
cjt θ . This 
formulation implies that industry-specific neutral technological changes have the same effect 
on revenue as industry-specific price changes.  
  Following Woodland (1982), Kohli (1991), and Harrigan (1997), in order to 
operationalize the model, we assume a translog revenue function:5 
() () ()



























jk j j 0j 00
v ln p θ ln γ lnv lnv β
2
1
lnv β p θ ln p θ ln α
2
1





where j,k index goods and i,h index factors. Symmetry of cross-effects implies:  
k j i h and hi ih kj jk , , , ∀ = = β β α α   (6) 
Further, linear homogeneity in v and p requires: 
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Differentiating the natural logarithm of the revenue function with respect to each pj, 
we obtain the share of industry j in country c’s GDP at time t, scjt: 
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This equation relates a theory-consistent measure of sectoral specialization to their 
underlying economic determinants: relative prices, technology, and factor endowments. The 
                                                 
4 A suficient condition is that there are at least as many factors as goods (see Redding, 2002). 
5 The translog model is frequently interpreted as a second order approximation to an unknown function form (see 
Greene, 1997).    5
translog specification implies that the coefficients on the variables are constant across 
countries and over time. 
We are interested in the economies’ overall degree of manufacturing specialization. 
Specialization can be defined as the narrowness of the range of activities developed in a 
country. Thus, a country is highly specialized if a few industries account for large shares of 
its overall industrial activity. To measure a country’s overall degree of absolute 











cjt ct s H   (9) 
where n1 is the number of manufacturing sectors and  1 n
cjt s  is the share of industry j in 
country c’s total manufacturing value added at time t. This index ranges between 1/n1, when 
all sectors account for the same share of total economic activity, and 1, when the whole 
activity is accounted by only one sector. In particular, the more unequal the sectoral shares, 
the more specialized an economy. 
Noting that  1 1 n
cjt
n
ct cjt s s s = , where the first term measures the share of manufacturing in 
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Taking natural logarithms on both sides of Equation (10) and expanding in a first 
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(11) 
We follow Redding (2002) in assuming non-traded goods prices and technology 
differences as being drawn from an estimable probability function. Further, we use MFN 
tariffs to capture cross-country differences in relative prices of traded goods as well as 
preferential tariffs as additional control (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Moreover, 
we proxy cross-country differences in relative endowments using GDP per capita (see 
Helpman, 1987, and Romalis, 2004). Our estimation equation therefore becomes: 
 
                                                 
6 The logarithm of H is interpreted as a function of the logarithm of the underlying variables.   6






ct 1 ct ε ρ η lnGDPPC δ τ 1 τ 1 ln δ τ 1 ln δ lnH + + + + + − + + + = ln   (12) 
where  MFN
ct τ  is the average MFN tariff set by country c at time t;  P
ct τ is the average 
preferential tariff set by country c at time t  (within the Latin American Integration 
Association LAIA or in the most important sub-regional trade agreement in which the 
country is member is member), so that the term in brackets is a measure of preferential 
margin; ct GPDPPC is the Gross Domestic Product per Capita of country c at time t;  c η are 
country fixed effects that control for any permanent country-specific barriers to trade (e.g., 
remoteness), any permanent country-differences in technology (e.g., associated as social 
infrastructure, see Hall and Jones, 1999) and/or any permanent country-differences in the 
relative importance of manufacturing; and 
t ρ  are year fixed effects that capture common 
changes in relative prices, technologies, factor endowments, and manufacturing shares 
across countries.  
One well known result of the standard international trade theory is that unilateral 
trade liberalization induces countries to specialize according to their overall comparative 
advantage. Declining external trade barriers are thus associated with a diminished range of 
commodities domestically produced and an expanded range of goods import from abroad, 
i.e., increased specialization. This result holds both in the Ricardian as well as in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model (see Dornbusch et al., 1977, and Romalis, 2004). We expect then the 
estimated coefficient on MFN to be significantly negative, i.e., higher tariffs lead to sectoral 
diversification in production and vice versa. On the other hand, regional trade integration 
leads economies to specialize according to their regional comparative advantage (see 
Venables, 2003). This would also imply a reduction in the range of goods produced at home. 
A priori, conditional on the degree of external openness, this might further increase 
specialization, i.e., stronger concentration of manufacturing activity in fewer sectors.  
Furthermore, a negative estimated coefficient on GDP per capita is also expected. 
This can be explained in terms of preference or portfolio arguments. In the presence of non-
homothetic preferences, changing consumption patterns towards greater diversity prevails 
as income growth, which induces matching changes in the structure of production when 
trade costs are very high (see Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003). The second reason relates to the fact 
that, because of indivisibilities, sectoral diversification opportunities improve with the 
aggregate capital stock and the level of development (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997).   7
The Herfindahl index is a common measure of sectoral concentration in the 
international trade and economic geography literatures (see, e.g., Sapir, 1996, Haaland et al., 
1999). This is however only one measure among many different ones and, a priori, there is no 
reason to favor one over the other. Therefore, to check the robustness of our results, we 
follow Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) in using also the Gini coefficient based on sector shares. 
This coefficient, like the previous indicator, increases with higher inequality in sectoral 
shares (see Cowell, 2002). 
  As a result of the trade policy reforms implemented in the region, countries may not 
only become more or less absolutely specialized but also more or less similar to each other. 
This corresponds to the notion of relative specialization. In particular, a country is relatively 
specialized if its economic structure differs from that of some reference benchmark, such as 
the region as whole or the remaining countries that belong to the relevant economic space, 
jointly or individually considered. Here we will focus on bilateral relative specialization, i.e., 
to what extent the sectoral composition of manufacturing value added differs across pairs of 
countries. To compare countries’ economic structures we use the Krugman index (see 













cjt cdt s s K   (13) 
  This index ranges between 0 if both countries have an identical industrial structure 
and takes a maximum of 1 if they have no industries in common. Hence, the more unequal 
the countries’ sectoral shares, the greater the relative specialization. 







ct djt cjt s s s s s s − = −  and substituting for the country-
specific sectoral shares in Equation (13), we obtain: 
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  (14) 
where we assume that if considered factors are equal across countries, then their 
production structures differ by a constant summarizing any other influences. Taking natural 
logarithms on both sides of Equation (14), expanding in a first–order Taylor series around 
[1…1]’, and making similar assumptions as before, we derive the following estimation 
equation: 
   8






ct 1 cdt ν ψ µ lnGDPPC lnGDPPC τ 1 ln τ 1 ln τ 1 ln lnK + + + − + + + + − + = ϕ ϕ ϕ   (15) 
where we use differences in MFN tariffs and the average bilateral (preferential) 
tariffs to measure differences in relative prices and differences in GDP per capita to account 
for differences in relative endowments. The country-pair effects cd µ control for any 
permanent country-pair specific differences in trade barriers (e.g., bilateral distances) 
and/or any permanent differences in technology (e.g., originated in distinct institutional 
settings), while the time fixed effects 
t ψ  capture common changes across countries in 
relative prices, technology, and factor endowments. 
Given that Latin American countries have comparative advantage in a relatively 
homogenous subset of industries with respect to the rest of the world, our hypothesis is that 
the sign of the estimated coefficient on the first term (i.e., bilateral differences in MFN tariffs) 
will be positive, i.e., larger differences in MFN tariffs and thus in the nominal average 
protection conceded to domestic production will result in increased divergence of industrial 
structures. On the other hand, the impact of bilateral tariff barriers on the degree of sectoral 
dissimilarity of manufacturing production will be negative, i.e., for given extra-zone trade 
impediments, bilateral (preferential) trade liberalization will induce inter-industry 
specialization so that countries’ economic structure will tend to be more dissimilar. Under 
the relative tariff structure associated with a preferential trade arrangement, some 
commodities that were originally domestically produced become to be  imported from those 
partners that, even with a comparative disadvantage relative to the rest of the world, have a 
regional comparative advantage, so that  sectoral composition of countries’ production may 
be expected to diverge. We are of course aware that opening may favor intra-industry 
specialization (see Frankel and Rose, 1998). However, as discussed in Venables (2003), we 
believe that the first case is more likely among developing countries like the ones we are 
considering here. Finally, we expect the difference in the relative endowments and levels of 
development (i.e., differences in GDPPC) to be positive.  
 
3.2 Econometric  Issues 
 
In estimating Equations (12) and (15), there are several econometric issues that must be 
addressed. First, our raw dependent variables, the absolute specialization index H and the 
relative specialization index K, can only adopt values within [0,1] so that they are truncated. 
As a consequence, classical estimation will lead to biased estimates. Their natural logarithms   9
range in  ) 0 , (−∞  and thus only partially solve the problem. We therefore perform a logistic 
transformation, similar to Balassa and Noland (1989), to check whether this makes a 
difference. These variables become then  ( ) ( ) H 1 H ln −  and  ( ) ( ) K 1 K ln − with both ranging 
in ) , ( +∞ −∞ . Since we do not observe significant differences between those results obtained 
using the natural logarithms of the specialization indicators and those found using their 
logistic transformations, we will only report the former ones. 
In addition, the standard error component model assumes that the regression 
disturbances are homoscedastic with the same variance across time and across individuals. 
This is undoubtedly a very restrictive assumption. Given the panel nature of the data, one 
can presume that there may be a specific pattern of disturbances associated to the presence 
of groups of observations. Thus, cross-sectional units may be size-asymmetric and as a result 
may have different variations (see Baltagi, 1995). Furthermore, the basic model assumes that 
the error terms are not correlated across individuals. However, economies are not only tied 
to specific factors, they are also tied to common macroeconomic factors affecting the region 
as a whole (see Greene, 1997) and likely with differential repercussions across groups of 
nations. Hence, it seems likely that disturbances could be correlated across countries. 
Finally, the classical LSDV model assumes that the only correlation over time is due to the 
presence of the same individual across the panel. In particular, the equicorrelation 
coefficient is the same no matter how far periods are in time. Clearly, this is also a restrictive 
assumption for the economic relationships under consideration, as an unobserved shock in 
the current period might affect the specialization patterns for at least some coming periods 
(see Baltagi, 1995). Ignoring groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross sectional correlation and/or 
serial correlation when they are present results in consistent but inefficient estimates of the 
regression coefficients and biased standard errors. Therefore, we have performed relevant 
test statistics for identifying such data features. 
The modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity in residuals suggests 
that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity across panels should be rejected. In addition, 
the Breusch-Pagan LM test indicates that the null hypothesis of independence of error across 
panels should be also rejected. Finally, the Baltagi-Li LM test for first order serial correlation 
in a fixed effects model points out that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation should be 
rejected, too. Hence, an estimation strategy that corrects these non-spherical disturbances is 
required. We remove autocorrelation from the data using the Prais-Winsten transformation 
and, since the number of cross sectional units is similar to the number of time periods, we   10
then apply LS but replacing LS standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors 
accounting for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels as 
indicated in Beck and Katz (1996). 
Furthermore, estimating Equations (12) and (15) without controlling for relevant 
additional time-varying factors, may result in biased estimates (see Greene, 1997). First, Imbs 
and Wacziarg (2003) have uncovered a non-monotonic pattern of sectoral concentration of 
economic activity across the development path. More specifically, higher levels of GDP per 
capita are associated with lower degrees of absolute specialization up to a certain point and 
increased specialization thereafter. According to Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), this relationship 
might emerge as a result of different forces prevailing along the development process: forces 
pushing for diversification, namely, non-homothetic preferences on the consumption side 
and portfolio arguments on the investment side, and forces favoring specialization, namely, 
declining trade barriers as in the Ricardian model and spatial concentration of economic 
activities with increasing returns to scale as highlighted by new economic geography models 
(see, e.g., Fujita et al., 1999, and Baldwin et al., 2003). We therefore include a squared GDP 
per capita term to account for this non-linear relationship in Equation (12) to avoid a likely 
omitted variable bias. We expect the estimated coefficients on GDPPC and GDPPC squared 
to be negative and positive, respectively.  
Another possible source of omitted variable biases are the episodes of real exchange 
rat e m is al ign m en t  an d, in  p art icul ar , real ap p reci at io n  t h at  h av e b een  o b serv ed in  Lat in  
America as countries implemented macroeconomic stabilization programs during the 
sample period (see Edwards, 1994). In order to control for the influence of those phenomena 
on the real economy, we add an index of effective exchange rate for imports or a measure of 
the level of real exchange rate misalignment to Equation (12). A low and particularly an 
overvalued real exchange rate (i.e., below the equilibrium level) favors imports over 
domestic production and thus may induce a concentration of economic activity in sectors in 
which the country has significant comparative advantage, i.e., greater production 
specialization. We are also aware that this effect may be stronger, the lower the trade 
barriers. An interaction between the average MFN tariffs and the real exchange rate 
variables will be therefore also considered. On the other hand, a low/overvalued real 
exchange rate may facilitate the imports of required inputs (capital goods) by firms in a 
broader set of sectors that might become internationally competitive producers and thus   11
may foster sectoral diversification.7 The impact of real exchange rate on absolute production 
specialization is then an empirical question. We also control for the effect of the exchange 
rate behavior when examining relative specialization. In particular, we introduce the 
absolute difference of the aforementioned measures of real exchange rate in Equation (15). 
These are expected to have a positive impact on the degree of difference of countries’ 
manufacturing structures. 
Finally, some endogeneity problems may be involved. Tariffs, both MFN and 
preferential, may endogenous. Thus, protectionism could be expected to be fiercer in larger, 
more diversified economies, since trade liberalization would affect many sectors and larger 
shares of population. On the other hand, smaller, less diversified economies have 
traditionally received special treatment in Latin America. These countries have conceded 
smaller tariff preferences to larger neighbors at least for certain periods. In addition, GDPPC 
as well as the real exchange rate variables may be endogenous. In particular, we can think of 
a simultaneity bias. Endogenous growth models highlight that an economy’s pattern of 
international specialization and its rate of economic growth are jointly and endogenously 
determined (see, e.g., Redding, 1999). The same is also true for the real exchange rate and 
countries’ specialization patterns (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). Moreover, highly 
specialized countries are more prone to suffer from idiosyncratic business cycles and thus 
from higher expected exchange rate variability and larger average misalignments.  
In order to check the robustness of our results we have therefore carried out GMM 
estimations and performed the Sargan and Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions. In 
particular, two main dynamic panel estimators can be considered: those proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) (“Differenced GMM”) and Blundell and Bond (1998) (“System 
GMM”). It is well known that for short panels with a large number of cross sectional units 
highly persistent series lead to severe finite sample bias in the first case, because the lagged 
levels are weak instruments of the differences. This is not the case for our econometric 
analysis of absolute manufacturing specialization. The number of time periods (14 years) is 
larger than the number of panels (10 countries) and, even though there is evidence of 
persistence, this not strong enough to be a cause of concern.8 We will therefore only report 
                                                 
7 Rebelo and Vegh (1995) maintain that exchange rate-based stabilizations have tended to be associated with real 
exchange rate appreciations and sharp deterioration of external accounts reflecting a large increase of durables and 
capital goods imports. 
8 The estimated rho parameter is around 0.400. The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
according to the bias-corrected LSDV estimator developed by Kiviet (1995) is around 0.600. Further, we find that   12
estimates based on the method proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In contrast, the data 
used to perform estimations on relative specialization requires a more careful investigation, 
as the number of cross-sectional units, i.e., country pairs (45), is significantly larger than the 
number of years (14). Further, the number of observations is relatively large (around 500), 
which allows using a richer set of instruments. Hence, we will also present results obtained 
according to the method developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
 
4  Trade Policy Reforms in Latin America 
 
During more than 40 years most Latin American countries maintained high tariff barriers 
with the rest of the world to support a strategy of import-substituting industrialization. 
Since the mid-1980s these countries started to implement trade policy reforms consisting of 
sharp cuts of nominal tariffs, reduction of tariff dispersion, and elimination of non-tariff 
barriers. The pace of these reforms was particularly rapid during the second half of the 1980s 
and the early 1990s. Thus, simple average MFN tariff in our sample countries fell almost 30 
percentage points from 41.57% in 1985 to 13.09% in 2001 with most of this drop taking place 
between 1985 and 1992.  Figure 1 presents the evolution of average MFN tariffs per country 
over the sample period. Note that in most countries tariffs reached a peak before they begun 
to be reduced as they were increased in anticipation of the future diminutions to delay 
effective liberalization and thus smooth the consequent adjustment. At the initial year we 
can identify three groups of countries with tariffs higher than 50% (Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru), countries with intermediate tariffs (Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela), and countries with average tariffs around and below 20% (Bolivia, Chile, and 
Paraguay). By 1992, after drastic slashes with varying intensity across countries, the 
dispersion of MFN tariff in the region had fallen from 17.25 in 1985 to 3.48.  
  Countries under examination have also opened their economies on a preferential 
basis. LAIA is an area of economic preferences created in 1980 trough the Montevideo 
Treaty. In virtue of this arrangement, countries conceded tariff preferences with respect to 
the rest of the world either to all remaining member nations or to a certain subset of them. 
Thus, tariffs within the region have been lower than MFN tariffs and have been reduced 
even more dramatically. The average preferential tariff faced by countries being analyzed 
                                                                                                                                          
this coefficient is almost identical when estimating pure autoregressive models using both the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Blundel and Bond (1998) estimators (0.373 and 0.400, respectively).   13
fell from 39.91% in 1985 to 5.98% in 2001. Figure 2 highlights the evolution of average 
preferential tariffs set by each county in our sample. Notice that these tariffs experienced a 
substantial drop during the early 1990s.  
The asymmetric path of MFN and preferential tariffs implied an important increase 
in the average preferential margin, which reached 111.61% in 2001 after beginning with 
4.31% in 1985. This regional dimension of trade liberalization was additionally deepened by 
preferential integration agreements formed by subsets of the countries. The most important 
initiatives for our sample countries are MERCOSUR, which was established in 1991 by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and the Andean Community, a trading 
arrangement formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In 2001 average 
intra-zone tariffs within these blocs ranged between 2% and 3%. 
 
5  The Impact of Trade Policy Reforms on Manufacturing Specialization Patterns 
 
5.1  Trade Policy Reforms and Absolute Manufacturing Production Specialization  
 
Figure 3 plots the trend of the Herfindahl specialization index based on sectoral value added 
shares for each country in the sample over the period 1985-1998. In general, as expected, the 
larger countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, exhibit lower levels of absolute 
manufacturing specialization. Most Latin American countries are specialized in exploiting 
their natural resources endowments. The share of food products ranges between 0.10 and 
0.25 with the highest relative importance in the industrial structures of Southern Cone 
countries. In addition, petroleum refineries account for large shares of total manufacturing 
activity in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
  Specialization seems to follow an upward trend in most countries. In fact, regressing 
the Herfindahl Index on a time trend, we find that six out of ten countries experienced 
significant increases in their overall levels of production specialization: Brazil, Colombia 
(from 1987 onwards), Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.9 This essentially reflects 
developments in the countries’ larger manufacturing sectors. For example, in Ecuador the 
combined share of the two largest industries, food products and petroleum refineries, grew 
                                                 
9 We have tested for non-stationarity to determine whether there are concrete reasons to be concerned about this 
issue. In particular, we have performed the Levin-Lin-Chu test (Levin et al., 2002) for panel unit roots on the 
specialization variable for alternative balanced panels. In doing this, we have introduced one lag of this variable to 
allow for serial correlation in the errors. The null hypothesis of unit root is strongly rejected for all considered 
configurations, regardless whether we include a time trend or not.   14
from 0.28 in 1985 to 0.53 in 1996 mainly as a result of the rapid relative expansion of the 
latter sector. In Uruguay this combined share increased from 0.27 in 1987 to 0.41 in 1998 and 
in Ven ezuela from 0.29 to  0.42 over th e same lapse. In summ ary, man y Latin American 
countries displayed increasing absolute manufacturing production specialization during a 
period characterized by declining trade impediments. To what extent can these changes in 
specialization patterns be related to the trade policy reforms implemented in this region? 
The remaining of this subsection aims at answering this question through a formal 
econometric analysis. 
  Table 1 reports Prais-Winsten estimations with panel corrected standard errors of 
different specifications of Equation (12).10 There is a robust and systematic negative 
relationship between own MFN tariffs and a country’s degree of absolute specialization in 
industrial production. Hence, unilaterally declining own tariff barriers with respect to the 
rest of the world is associated with increased sectoral concentration of manufacturing 
production. On the other hand, average preferential margins conceded by countries in the 
framework of LAIA (AVPM) or sub-regional integration agreements such as the 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (RIAPM) do not have a significant impact on the 
level of overall industrial specialization.11 Regional integration might have triggered changes 
in the sectoral distribution of manufacturing activity which are different from those 
promoted by opening up to the rest of the world. In particular, regional trade agreements 
might have induced countries to become more specialized in sectors in which they have 
comparative advantage within the region, but not in the external markets. In Latin America, 
economies have relatively similar comparative advantage patterns vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, but have comparative advantage in different industries at the regional level. Further, 
those sectors which are (not) internationally competitive were initially relatively large 
(small). Hence, if preferential trade liberalization has fostered specialization in industries 
with regional comparative advantage more than in those with global comparative advantage 
and the former were initially smaller, then changes in the distribution of economic activity 
over sectors will not necessarily lead to a significant increase in the specialization level. 
                                                 
10 Estimation results with tariff variables lagged one period to account for the possibility that their impact on 
specialization patterns follow with a lag are essentially the same.These results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
11 Figure 3 shows that levels of specialization and their evolution over time differ across economies. To exclude the 
possibility that these findings are driven by specific country experiences, we drop one country at a time from the 
sample and re-estimate Equation (12). Regression results basically coincide with those shown in Table 1 thus 
confirming the main messages. We also explore whether estimates are sensitive to changes in the sample period, by 
successively considering periods beginning in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990. Again, results are essentially the 
same. These results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request.   15
Then, depending on the initial industrial structure, the impact on overall specialization 
might be weaker in this case.  
Previous estimations control for country specific factors that remain constants over 
time as well as common changes across countries. However, according to economic theory, 
there are important additional time-varying country-specific factors that may affect the 
degree of industrial specialization and thus the relation under examination. One of these 
factors is relative endowment as proxied by the GDP per capita. Results including these 
variables are presented in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1. As expected, the estimated coefficient 
on GDPPC is negative and significant, while that on the squared GDPPC is positive and 
significant across the different specifications. Hence, there is non-linear (U-shaped) 
relationship between sectoral concentration of manufacturing value added and the level of 
per capital income, i.e., first sectoral diversification occurs, but there is a level of per capital 
income beyond which countries start to specialize again. This coincides with findings 
reported in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). 
Another important time-varying factor whose omission may lead to biases estimates 
is the real exchange rate. Estimates obtained when incorporating this variable are shown in 
Table 2. Without considering potential nonlinearities, the real effective exchange rate for 
imports seems to be positively related to the overall level of specialization (Column 1). 
However, when its interplay with trade policy is accounted for, the estimated coefficient on 
this exchange rate variable is negative and significant, whereas that on the interaction term 
is positive and significant (Column 2). Thus, we observe that the higher MFN tariffs and real 
exchange rate, the greater the absolute manufacturing specialization. In the case of real 
exchange rate misalignment, the same sign pattern prevail, but estimated coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero (Column 4). Henceforth, there is some evidence suggesting 
that a high exchange rate induces manufacturing production diversification when trade 
barriers are low, but promote industrial specialization when coupled with high tariff 
barriers.   
We check the robustness of our results to the specialization measure being used and 
the econometric strategy. We first replicate previous regressions using the logarithm of the 
Gini coefficient calculated on sectoral manufacturing value added instead of the Herfindahl 
index as dependent variable. Estimations are reported in Tables 3 and 4 and they confirm 
most of our previous findings. Table 5 presents results obtained performing GMM 
estimations using the procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). These estimations   16
aim at addressing possible endogeneity problems in the regressions discusses above. Our 
main conclusion still holds. Unilateral trade liberalization, i.e., reducing own MFN tariffs 
with respect to the rest of the world is associated with more concentrated manufacturing 
production structures. Estimated coefficients on remaining variables are similar to those 
reported in Table 2, except the one on the interaction between real exchange rate 
misalignment and tariffs, which now becomes significantly positive thus providing 
additional evidence of non-monotonicities in the impact of exchange rate on overall absolute 
specialization.12  
This sub-section has revealed that trade policy reforms in Latin America have had a 
substantial impact on countries’ international specialization patterns. In particular, unilateral 
opening has favored increasing manufacturing production specialization. Trade 
liberalization initiatives may also influence relative specialization across country pairs. More 
specifically, the magnitude of the differences in the extent to which nations liberalize their 
trade flows with the rest of the world as well as the level of bilateral (preferential) trade 
barriers may affect how similar is the sectoral composition of manufacturing production 
across country pairs. The following sub-section assesses this possibility.  
 
5.2  Trade Policy Reforms and Manufacturing Production Structures: Convergence or 
Divergence? 
 
  We measure relative manufacturing specialization with the Krugman index. This 
index quantifies the degree of bilateral sectoral disparity of industrial structures. Figure 4 
presents the Krugman index for each country pair in our sample over the period 1985-1998. 
According to a simple regression of this index on a time trend, 22 out of 45 country pairs 
became more dissimilar in terms of their manufacturing structures and 7 out of 45 do not 
exhibit significant changes.13 Interestingly, half of the 16 cases of reductions involve Bolivia, 
                                                 
12 There is an additional, more complicated issue in this analysis, namely, if specialization, tariffs, and the level of 
development are jointly determined, there will be both direct and indirect effects that should be disentangled. For 
example, real exchange rate misaligments may have direct effects on specialization as well as indirect effects 
through the influence that they likely exert on choosing the level of tariff protection. We have therefore estimated 
alternative specifications of systems of equations by 3SLS and GMM where these variables are simultaneously 
treated as endogenous. This multiple equation strategy generates similar results to those from the single equation 
one. In addition, we observe that less diversified economies indeed set lower tariffs and tend to have lower levels of 
GDP per capita. These results are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
13 We have tested for non-stationarity of the specialization measure also in thie case. The Levin-Lin-Chu test (Levin 
et al., 2002) for panel unit roots  suggests that series are stattionary. This holds regardless whether we include a time 
trend or not and the specific balanced panel being considered.   17
which moved towards convergence in terms of sectoral distribution of economic activity 
after starting as the most dissimilar nation for each of its Latin American partners.14  
  Table 6 presents Prais-Winsten estimations with panel corrected standard errors of 
Equation (14). Two main results outstand. As expected, larger differences in the degree of 
unilateral openness with respect to the rest of the world and deeper bilateral (preferential) 
trade liberalization foster a higher degree of relative specialization, i.e., more dissimilar 
industrial structures. This is consistently true from the basic specification also when the level 
of development and variable reflecting the level of real exchange rate are introduced. In this 
sense, we should mention that larger differences in the real effective exchange rate for 
imports are associated with larger disparities in the sectoral distribution of manufacturing 
production.  
Table 7 shows that the core findings are confirmed after implementing GMM 
procedures to correct endogeneity biases: the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator and the 
Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator. Two considerations deserve being made. First, while 
differences in the real exchange rate for imports seem to be an important factor influencing 
cross-country differences in manufacturing structures according to the former estimator, 
differences in the degree of real exchange rate misalignment is the relevant one when the 
latter estimator is used. Second, although both sets of estimates are consistent as suggested 
by the respective specification tests, these distinct results across methods recommend to 
perform a carefully comparison. As mentioned before, highly persistent series may generate 
w e a k  i n s t r u m e n t  p r o b l e m s  a n d  t h u s  s e r i o u s  f i n i t e  s a m p l e  b i a s e s  w h e n  a p p l y i n g  t h e  
Arellano and Bond estimator. This may be detected by comparing the estimated coefficient 
on the lagged dependent variable to those from OLS, which is upward biased, and LSDV 
(Within), which is downward biased (see Bond, 2002). In our case, these coefficients are 
0.854 and 0.497, respectively, for the model specification shown in Columns 2 and 5. 
Estimates reported in Table 7 indicate that there is indeed evidence that the Arellano and 
Bond estimator is affected by finite sample bias. In contrast, the Blundel and Bond estimator 
produces an estimate which is well below the OLS one and well above the LSDV one thus 
appearing as our preferred estimation strategy. 
Hence, regional trade integration seems to have spurred inter-industry 
specialization across countries. This has profound macroeconomic implications. If countries 
                                                 
14 Bolivia is one the poorest country in the region and suffered from a severe hyperinflation episode during the first 
part of the 1980s.   18
become more dissimilar in terms of their production structures and thus more sensitive to 
specific industry shocks, more idiosyncratic business cycles would prevail (see Kenen, 1969, 
Eichengreen, 1992, and Krugman, 1993) and, if exchange rates are used as an adjustment 
mechanism to dampen cyclical fluctuations, higher bilateral exchange rate variability should 
be expected. This, in turn, might act as channel of agglomeration of economic activities in 
the larger countries in the region (see Ricci, 1998) and might promote reversions in the 
integration process in the form of reinsertion of protectionist measures (see Eichengreen, 
1993, and Fernández-Arias et al., 2002). 
 
6 Concluding  Remarks 
 
This paper has aimed at answering one main question: Did Latin American countries 
become more and differently specialized as a consequence of trade policy reforms? Our 
econometric analysis shows that the answer is yes.  
  Unilateral trade liberalization has resulted in increased absolute manufacturing 
production specialization. Weinhold and Rauch (1999) show that, at least for developing 
countries, this might have a positive impact, since specialization appears to be positively 
and significantly correlated with manufacturing productivity growth. One possible 
explanation for this result comes from models with endogenous growth through learning-
by-doing. In this framework, increased openness to international trade can lead to increased 
specialization, which in turn accelerates productivity growth by more fully realizing 
dynamic economies of scale. Of course, not only the degree, but also the nature of 
specialization is important (see Redding, 1999, and Bensidoun et al., 2001). In Latin America, 
industrial activity has on average become increasingly concentrated in sectors using 
intensively natural resources endowments. What does this imply for this region? According 
to Perri et al. (2001), the experience of other countries such as Australia, Canada, Sweden 
and Finland show that these rich endowments, when properly combined with policies 
stimulating the adoption of new technologies, are a proven growth recipe.  
Preferential trade liberalization has favored a broadening of the disparities between 
countries’ economic structures. This has important implications for the regional 
macroeconomics and the sustainability of ongoing integration processes. Inter-industry 
specialization and thus higher sensitivity to industry specific shocks are associated with 
more idiosyncratic business cycles and higher expected exchange rate variability, which in   19
turn affect locational incentives and trade flows generating pressures for reintroducing 
protectionist measures.  
  The previous findings seem to be quite robust. They hold regardless the 
specialization measure being used, the inclusion of control variables such the real effective 
exchange rate for imports and the real exchange rate misalignment, and remain valid after 
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The figure shows the trend of the Herfindahl Index for each of the sample 
















The figure shows the trend of the Krugman Index for each of the sample 
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The table reports Prais-Winsten  estimates with panel corrected standard errors as suggested in Beck 
and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and serial 
correlation). Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the 
standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable. Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, H, 
is the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the Herfindahl Index. MFN 
is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation Tariff set by the country plus one. AVPM 
is the average preferential margin conceded by the country to Latin American partners, i.e., the natural 
logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of AVPT plus one, where AVPT is the average 
preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of the LAIA. RIAPM is the average preferential 
margin conceded by the country within the most important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the 
natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus one, where RIAPT is the 
average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of this agreement. GDPPC is the 
natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC2: squared). * significant at 10%; ** 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HHHHH
MFN -0.245*** -0.308*** -0.301*** -0.228*** -0.220***
(0.061) (0.080) (0.068) (0.077) (0.075)
AVPM 0.098
(0.077)






Country-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 137 137 137 137 137  23













The table reports Prais-Winsten  estimates with panel corrected standard errors as 
suggested in Beck and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, 
cross-sectional correlation, and serial correlation). Reported estimated coefficients are 
standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective 
explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, H, is 
the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the 
Herfindahl Index. MFN is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation 
Tariff set by the country plus one. RIAPM is the average preferential margin conceded 
by the country within the most important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the 
natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus one, 
where RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of 
this agreement. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDPPC2: squared). REERM is the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated 
by the ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. REERMIS is the real exchange rate 
misalignment  estimated  by  Terra  and  Valladares  (2003)  for  the  period  1985-1998.            











(1) (2) (3) (4)
HHHH
MFN -0.271** -0.681*** -0.213** -0.230***
(0.086) (0.162) (0.083) (0.080)
RIAPM 0.169 0.121 0.032 0.028
(0.106) (0.104) (0.081) (0.085)
GDPPC -9.725** -10.632*** -8.034** -8.767**
(4.120) (3.810) (3.626) (3.500)
GDPPC2 8.825** 9.485*** 7.190** 7.835**





MFN x REERM 0.005***
(0.002)
MFN x RERMIS 0.111
(0.070)
Country-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 117 117 134 134  24
Table 3: The Impact of Unilateral and Preferential Trade Policy on Absolute Specialization  










The table reports Prais-Winsten  estimates with panel corrected standard errors as suggested in Beck 
and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and serial 
correlation). Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the 
standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable. Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, G, 
is the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the Gini Coefficient. MFN 
is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation Tariff set by the country plus one. RIAPM 
is the average preferential margin conceded by the country within the most important RIA with Latin 
American partners, i.e., the natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT 
plus one, where RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of this 
agreement. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC2: squared).   
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GGGGG
MFN -0.207*** -0.283*** -0.261*** -0.144** -0.138**
(0.056) (0.073) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063)
AVPM 0.120*
(0.070)






Country-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 137 137 137 137 137  25
Table 4: Absolute Specialization, Trade Policy, Level of Development, and Exchange Rate 













The table reports Prais-Winsten  estimates with panel corrected standard errors as 
suggested in Beck and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, 
cross-sectional correlation, and serial correlation). Reported estimated coefficients are 
standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective 
explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, G, is 
the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the Gini 
Coefficient. MFN is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation Tariff 
set by the country plus one. RIAPM is the average preferential margin conceded by the 
country within the most important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the natural 
logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus one, where 
RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of this 
agreement. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDPPC2: squared). REERM is the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated 
by the ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. REERMIS is the real exchange rate 
misalignment  estimated  by  Terra  and  Valladares  (2003)  for  the  period  1985-1998.                   










(1) (2) (3) (4)
GGGG
MFN -0.188** -0.554*** -0.147** -0.165**
(0.073) (0.132) (0.073) (0.070)
RIAPM 0.146 0.109 0.036 0.026
(0.096) (0.090) (0.063) (0.066)
GDPPC -8.960*** -9.875*** -7.038** -7.633***
(2.926) (2.728) (2.800) (2.666)
GDPPC2 7.796*** 8.500*** 5.893** 6.403***





MFN x REERM 0.004***
(0.001)
MFN x RERMIS 0.117*
(0.062)
Country-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 117 117 134 134  26












The table reports one step GMM estimations according to the 
procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) with all explanatory 
variables treated as endogenous. A lagged dependent variable is 
included (not reported). Reported estimated coefficients are 
standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of 
the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable. Sample size is defined as in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, H, is the natural 
logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the 
Herfindahl Index. MFN is the natural logarithm of the average Most 
Favored Nation Tariff set by the country plus one. RIAPM is the 
average preferential margin conceded by the country within the most 
important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the natural 
logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus 
one, where RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade 
flows with members of this agreement. GDPPC is the natural 
logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC2: squared). 
REERM is the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated by the 
ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. REERMIS is the real exchange rate 
misalignment estimated by Terra and Valladares (2003) for the period 
1985-1998. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 
























MFN x REERM 0.005**
(0.002)
MFN x REERMIS 0.265*
(0.156)
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes
Sargan Test 86.940 79.250 93.660
[p-value] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
Test for 2nd O. A. -0.160 -0.070 0.190
[p-value] [0.872] [0.945] [0.846]
Observations 117 107 114  27









The table reports Prais-Winsten estimates with panel corrected standard errors as 
suggested in Beck and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, 
cross-sectional correlation, and serial correlation). Sample size is defined as in Table A1 
in the Appendix. Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are 
multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and 
divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. The dependent variable, 
K, is the natural logarithm of the relative level of specialization as measured by the 
Krugman Index. DIFF MFN is the absolute difference of the natural logarithms of Most 
Favored Nation Tariffs set by the countries plus one. AVPT is the natural logarithm of 
the average bilateral preferential tariff plus one. DIFF GDPPC is the absolute difference 
of natural logarithms of the Gross Domestic Product per capita. DIFF REERM is the 
absolute difference of the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated by the 
ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. DIFF REERMIS is the absolute difference of the real 
exchange rate misalignments estimated by Terra and Valladares (2003) for the period 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
KKKKK
DIFF MFN 0.055* 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.119***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037)
AVPT -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.228*** -0.332***
(0.087) (0.085) (0.084) (0.088)






Country Pair-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 604 604 604 514 578  28










Columns (1)-(3) report one-step GMM estimations according to the procedure proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) with MFN and AVPT treated as predetermined and remaining 
variables as endogenous. Sample size defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The Sargan Test 
is based on two-step estimations (Arellano and Bond Estimations). Columns (4)-(6) report one-
step GMM estimations according to the procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Instrumented used are 1-5 lags of DMFN and AVPT, and 3-6 lags of DGDPPC, DRERM, 
DRERMIS in the level equation; and 2-6 lags of DMFN and AVPT, and 4-7 lags of DGDPPC, 
DRERM, DRERMIS in the difference equation. Reported estimated coefficients are 
standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective explanatory 
variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. The dependent 
variable, K, is the natural logarithm of the relative level of specialization as measured by the 
Krugman Index (K(-1): lagged one year). DIFF MFN is the absolute difference of the natural 
logarithms of Most Favored Nation Tariffs set by the countries plus one. AVPT is the natural 
logarithm of the average bilateral preferential tariff plus one. DIFF GDPPC is the absolute 
difference of natural logarithms of the Gross Domestic Product per capita. DIFF REERM is the 
absolute difference of the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated by the ECLAC for 
the period 1987-2001. DIFF REERMIS is the absolute difference of the real exchange rate 
misalignments estimated by Terra and Valladares (2003) for the period 1985-1998. * significant 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
K KKKKK
K(-1) 0.430*** 0.390*** 0.503*** 0.567*** 0.638*** 0.550***
(0.066) (0.055) (0.067) (0.220) (0.192) (0.127)
DIFF MFN 0.094** 0.074 0.097** 0.139** 0.075 0.157***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.040) (0.059) (0.063) (0.051)
AVPT -0.218*** -0.170** -0.237*** -0.442*** -0.285*** -0.308**
(0.073) (0.069) (0.078) (0.153) (0.130) (0.146)
DIFF GDPPC 0.277 0.290* 0.297 0.241* 0.051 0.174
(0.173) (0.175) (0.189) (0.146) (0.107) (0.153)
DIFF RERM 0.069** -0.125*
(0.034) (0.070)
DIFF RERMIS 0.034 0.353***
(0.032) (0.111)
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan/Hansen Test 30.420 35.440 30.610 16.530 24.670 24.180
[p-value] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [0.168] [0.214] [0.189]
Test for 2nd O. A. -0.600 -1.050 0.570 0.910 -0.800 1.350
[p-value] [0.546] [0.296] [0.571] [0.361] [0.424] [0.177]
Observations 514 469 488 559 514 533  29
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322 Wearing apparel, except footwear
323 Leather and leather products, except footwear and wearing apparel
324 Footwear, except vulcanized or moulded rubber or plastic footwear
331 Wood and wood and cork products, except furniture
332 Furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal
341 Paper and paper products
342 Printing, publishing and allied industries
351 Industrial chemicals
352 Other chemicals product
353 Petroleum refineries
354 Miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal
355 Rubber products
356 Plastic products not elsewhere classified
361 Pottery, china, and earthenware
362 Glass and glass products
369 Other non-metallic mineral products
371 Iron and steel
372 Non-ferrous metals
381 Fabricated metal products
382 Machinery, except electrical
383 Electrical machinery apparatus
384 Transport equipment
385 Professional, scientific, measuring, controlling,  photographic and optic equipment
390 Other manufacturing industries
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), Revision 2, 3 digits
Country Sectoral Coverage Number of Sectors Time Coverage Source
Argentina Manufacturing 28 1985-1998 PADI  (ECLAC)
Bolivia Manufacturing 28 1985-1998 IIS (UNIDO)
Brazil Manufacturing 28 1985-1998 PADI (ECLAC)
Chile Manufacturing 28 1985-1998 PADI (ECLAC)
Colombia Manufacturing 28 1985-1998 PADI (ECLAC)
Ecuador Manufacturing 28 1985-1997 IIS  (UNIDO)
Mexico Manufacturing 28 1985-1998 PADI (ECLAC)
Peru Manufacturing 28 1985-1996 PADI (ECLAC)
Uruguay Manufacturing 28 1985-1998 PADI (ECLAC)
Venezuela Manufacturing 28 1985-1998 PADI (ECLAC)
















Country Variable Time Coverage Source
Argentina REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Bolivia REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Brazil REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Chile REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Colombia REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Ecuador REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1994 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Mexico REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Peru REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Uruguay REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Venezuela REERM 1987-1998 ECLAC
RERMIS 1985-1998 Terra and Valladares (2003)
Real Exchange Rate Measures: Countries, Time Coverage, and Sources
Country Variable Time Coverage Source
Argentina MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Bolivia MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Brazil MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Chile MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Colombia MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Ecuador MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Mexico MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Peru MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Uruguay MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
Venezuela MFN 1985-1998 IDB/INT
PT 1985-1998 IDB/INT
MFN and Preferential Tariffs: Countries, Time Coverage, and Sources